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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
LOGAN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 





ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We desire to bring . to the attention , ,of the Court, 
some additional facts which Appellant's statement omits, 
in order to present a clearer picture of the factual situa-
tion. 
Presently, the area immediately surrounding Re-
spondents' home is exclusively a residential district, 
occupied mostly by new or near new homes. (Note: all 
references will be to the transcript of testimony). The 
school to be built will house all the children of Logan of 
junior high school age with the usual attendant annoyan-
ces, from increased activities due to buses, bicycles, pri-
vate automobiles, recess activities, band practices, and 
other disquieting features incident to the operation of 
such a public institution (Tr. 57 thru 61). 
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The witness,--' G.· Frank Raymond, who- is A~sistant 
Superintendent_ (Tr. 57) -;of, Pl~intiff, on.-cr.oss examin-
ation. said .in reference to the Croft home after .the 
construction and ~peration of the schoo~: "Mayb,e_ I . 
wouldn't (want to live that close). And that he would 
rather be a\~dy· (Tr.~6o)>:M:eaning ·that he would\·ather 
have his ~wn hou{e away,fromthe scho~l. 
Witness J. B .. Gunnelt (Tr~ 77 thru80) testified that 
the proposed. school as. shown by th~ JI],ap On page 3 of 
Plaintiff''s brief would lesson the value of the Croft 
home to the extent of $4,000.00. That he was an appraiser 
fot> the Federal Housing Administration (Tr. 69), and 
that the schoofwould force the Croft home to be classi-
fied under· the term '' inhaimonious use'', and this would 
cause the FHA to reject. it for insurance. And further; 
<rl?. 94) "Q. ¥ow, you ill;dicated tha~ this diminution in 
~· , . . '' . ·-
value of the actual reside,nce by reason of the construe-~ 
ti~n of the school to the north has a twelve per cent dimi-
nution in value or severance damage~ A. Yes.'' 
The' ju:ry viewecl the premises (Tr. ·l~~:J24) and 
heard the evidence, in relation t.o the damage to the Croft 
hon1e. While no part of the school building. as presently 
planned will be . on property taken from the Crofts, ·the 
over~ll in~tallation does call-for a car parking lot {p. 3.; · 
Plaintiff's brief) locate(f,over the West portion of the · 
land taken from the Crofts. 
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The lower court did not err in instructing the jury 
on Question No. 3 of the Special Verdict. 
In answer to the first reason cited by plaintiff for 
error in the submission of the third question to the jury 
the defendants point out the differences in the constitu-
tions of the United States ~nd Utah. In the 5th Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States it is said, 
"Nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation''~',while tl~e Utah Co~stitu-. 
-~ I . . ' ~ f 
tion states that "private property shall not be taken or 
dr;tmaged ( 9urs) for publi~ ~se ~ithout j~st compens-
.. :. ' ' ' •' 
tion.". The inclusion of the. word "damages" must be 
given meaning. In :lB. Am. J~r, page 763 it i~ stated that 
the most obvious interpre.tation of this word, "damaged", 
is that there may be compensation awarded for land not 
taken but which has peen depreciated by the taking and 
proposed construction on the land. Utah has elaborated 
on this constitutional p.rovision by enacting Section 78-
34-10, U.C.A., 1953,. where it states in Par. (3) that the 
jury must ascertain and assess damages '' ( 3' If the 
property though no part is taken, will be damaged by the 
construction of the proposed improvement, the amount 
of such damages". Nowhere does it state that the pro-
posed improvement must be entirely upon the property 
of the condemnee. 
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In the case of L. A. '&,• S. L .. RR. Co. vs. Board of 
Education of Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 13, 99 P. 263, it 
washeld that the school board was entitled to damages 
to the remainder of its property where there was con-
demnation of partof theland. It must be presumed that 
the railroad comes from somewhere and goes som~where 
and therefore the. damages accrue because of the use by 
the railroad along the entire track and not just the use 
upon the portion condemned. This view is generally 
taken where it is difficult to separately ascertain the 
amount. of damages, and because of this difficulty the 
court's have held that the land owner is entitled to re-
cover. for damages resulti~g to the_ remainder of his es-
tate by the uses made' or tobe made of the lands acquired 
from, third persons for the same undertaking. See Hag-
gard v. Independent School Dist. 1901, Iowa, 85 N.W. 777. 
Also 170. A. L. R. beginning 721 to 728. What are the 
. ,. 
d~m.ages caused by a section of a railroad track, a por-
tion of a street, or a portion of a school? It seems quite 
•~ ' • I ' 
reasonable that the construction of the total project as 
a unit must be lo~ked to in order to determine the dam-
• ,I -
ages, .and 'wnell. these d~mages ,are dis~in~t from those 
sustained by the remaind~r of the neighborhood then the 
damage is one allowed by the common law and the statu-
torylaw of this St~te. 
This Court in State v. District Court, Fourth Ju-
dical District 94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502 this CQurt said: 
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''This court has heretofore said that under the 
provisions of the Constitution of this state, a par-
ty, whose property is about to be specially dam-
aged in any substantial degtee for public use, 
has the same righta and is given the same remidies 
for the protection of his property from the threat-
ened injury. as would be accorded him if his 
property were actually taken and appropriated 
for such use." (citing Stockdale v. Rio Grande 
Western Railway Co. 28 Utah 201, 77 P. 849.) 
Further citing 1 Lewis on Eminent Domain (2nd Ed) 
57, it said: 
"T~e law, as t9 what C()nstitute~ a taking, has 
been undergoing radical changes in the last few 
yearS. And the great weight of the more recent 
judicial-authority, which we believe to be aupport-
ed by the _better reason, and which is more in ac-
cord with our ideas of equity and natural justice, 
holds- that any substantial 1nterference with pri-
vate property which destroys or materially les- -
sens its yalue, or by which. ~he owner's right to 
its use and enjoyment is in any substantial de-
gree abridged or destroyed, is, in fact and in law, 
a taking; in the constitutional sense, to the extent 
of the damage suffered, even though the title 
and possession of the owner remain undisturbed.'' 
The_ framers of· the fundamental law, after 
much debate and careful consideration of the 
hardship of the old rule which allowed compensa-
tion only in the case of a taking of prope·rty, 
wrote into the Constitution a provision by which 
we think they intended to guarantee to the land-
owner wh()se property is damaged just compen-
sation with the same certainty as to the landowner 
whose property is physically taken.'' 
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See also,Blesch v. Chicago & N. W. RR. 2 N.W. 113, 
(Wis.). 
Secondly, the plaintiff claims that defendants are 
not entitled to make a claim against the plaintiff for 
such damages to· pro peTty though no part is taken as 
this would in effect be a suit against a governmental body 
which enjoys immunity. The point is not well taken as 
this reasonin~ would bar any defendant from asserting 
damages in excess of the offer made by the plaintiff. 
In the prayer for relief contained in the complaint of 
the plaintiff there is the_ following: ''that compensation 
aJ!d. da!llage })e assessed for the takin,g of. the, said lands 
for such~ proposeq use''. Under the theory proposed by 
ph;tintiff the defendant 4as no right to ask for da;rnages 
for the_ §~ver~nce ,of the smaller. parcel from the larger 
parceland also for damages which accrue to the property 
not taken by reason of the construction of the proposed 
school with all its fa~ilities. The defendant cannot be 
bound by the allegations and prayer of the plaintiff as 
the plaintiff would then have the ability to dictate whet-
her or not~ the defendant should have damages as out-
lined in our statutes, and the concept of just compensa-
tion for property taken or damaged would be mere fic-
tion. 
The Courts that have held- that the persons whose 
l~rld is damaged but n~t taken have no. right of action, 
hold so because:, (1) tl~eir constitutiolls _do not allow for 
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the award of darnage.s but award damages for only the 
taking; (2) the individual cannot sue the political body. 
However in Haggard v. Independent School District, 
supra, th~ court there said by inference tha( an action 
by the school board for condemnation opened the door 
for a claim by the defendant for all the damages sus-
tained by them which were allowed by the laws of the 
juristdiction. 
The Utah cases cited, by th~ pl~intiff can he distil}.-. 
quished in that they pertain to ,origi:p.al ac,~ions b:r;ought _ 
by individuals against a ((OU.D:~Y or otP:er political ~ubdiv- _ 
isions. Th,e case_ of ._Springville :Banking Co. y._ Burton, 
10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P. 2d 157 can be rec~;ncil~q in_t:Q.a~ the 
plaintiff there sought to .. bring _a Mandamus action to 
compel the state to pay da111ages there})y seeking to do 
. something indirectly that he could not do directly. Where-
as in our case the action was started by the School 
Board an<;l the defendants claim damages under the pro-
visions of the constitution of the state and the statutes 
controlling condemnation actions. Here ·the defendants 
have pursued a right givell. to them by the Constitution 
and the laws of this st~te. ,Again re~erring to the. case 
of State v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, su-
pra, this Court said : 
"We think is is clear that the framers of the. 
Constitution did not intend to give the rights 
granted by Section 22, and then leave the citizen 
powerless to enforce such rights. We· held that 
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this is so . whether the injury complained . of by 
the "plaintiff in the injunction suit is considered 
a. 'taking' of the property, or a 'damaging' of 
property."' ·- . . 
''We think if a case atises where there is no 
other method of enforcing a constitutional right 
except by suit against the State, then is must be 
considered that the State has given its consent to 
be sued in such a case.'' 
Cases in other jurisdictions state by inference that 
the tight to ;ask for damages ;other than set forth in the 
complaint of the plaintiff is conceded by the plaintiff 
when it filed the complaint that brings the action to con-
demn. See Haggard v. Independant School District, su-
pra:, where the court said: 
''I:rtcase of.condeinllation for railway purposes, 
compensation for depreciation in the value of the 
~-,remainder of the tract due to the proximity of the 
railroad operated in the usual and proper man-
ner, and the inconvenience and annoyance result- -
: ing therefrom (is allowed). We see no reason, 
·ihexefore, why the inconvenience due to the prox-
imity of a school house, as affecting the market 
value_ of. appellee's residence property, should 
not be taken into account." 
· The Iowa Court allowed the defendant to have dam-
ages not only for the taking and severance by also for 
the diminution in value of the property, without the 
holding that the plaintiff could not be sued and that the 
claim for additional damages wa_s ·doing indirectly what 
could not be done directly. 
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It is a fact that the School· Board in -our cas-e con-
sented to the claim of defendants for additional assess-
ment of compensation and darruiges. I-Iow else can a 
pal'ty g~in the '' ju~t compensfL~iq;n.-,.and. d~a~.ea'' as set 
forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of 78--34-10 U. G. A., if he 
c~nnot allege the damages he is :entitled to when the ' 
same is not set forth in the complaint of th~ plaintiff. 
This is not a separate action against the political body 
or a counterclaim but a prayer for relief as provided 
for in our constitution and statutes, and a, riglJ.t that tl1.e 
courts of this State have preserved. 
Plaintiff's third reason for error on Point 1 'is that · 
for consequential dama~es or spedial daniag~s.to be s~s­
stained they must be that recognized at comw-on law. In 
18 American Jurisprudence at ·page 756 it is stated that 
for the da~age to be actionabie there ~u~t be a d:istinc- ; 
tion between the damage suffere~ by· the residents of the " 
neighborhood and the defendant. On page 96-97 of the 
transcript, witness Gunnell state~ that the homes'on the 
opposite sige, ?f ~he ,~treet will, ~gffer ;no .damage. And-· 
Mr. Baugh, a witness for plaintiff (Tr; 2G4t states that 
the homes on the opposite side of the street.-wiU be en-
hanced and that the lots and the home to the south of 
:Mr.· Croft· will not· be damaged. Thu,s the record. shows 
that the defendants home is the only .one in the neighbor-· 
hood that will ·be depreciated by. ,the construction. of .the 
school. This is truly within the Jetter ofrthe ~ommo.n. 
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10 
law, as the house of defendants is· the only uninsurable 
house for F. H. A. purposes in the area for inharmonous 
use. 
Plaintiff cites the case of Richert v. The Board of 
Education of the City of Newton, 117 Kan. 502, 280 P. 
2d 596. This case can be distinguished in that the proper:-
ty owner brought the action, and none of his property 
was taken; also Richert relied upon the Federal Consti-
tution which omits the provision for "damages", as 
l(ansas does not have provision in their . constitution 
pertaining to the taking of land. The Schuler v. Wilson, 
153, N. E. 737, 48 A. L. R. 1027 case is similar. In these 
cases the courts seem to hinge the claim for consequen-
tial damages upon a condemnation action being started 
by the governmental body. We do not claim that this 
is the law in this state in view of our decisions. but 
state that an action for condemnation of a part of 
land serves as a basis for a claim for damages to the 
remainder, even though the damages acrue as a result 
. . . 
of construction of the project upon the lands of other 
persons, where said damages cannot be separated and 
as~ertain~d. 
POINT 2 
The second error raised by the plaintiff is that the 
trial court allowed in evidence an exhibit showing a pro-
posed subdivision planned by the defendants and two 
others. We might state at the outset of this argument that 
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at no time did any witness for the .defendants value ,the 
individual lots and then add those sums fer a totai· valu-
ation of the property. 
It is a weli recognized concept of the law 'of eminent 
dodtain that the proper criteria for the determination of 
corhp~msation is 'in~ ma~ket value o:f\he pr~perty, wllich -
is the ''highest price estimated in terms of money ~liich 
I , ;. ' " , 
it would bring if exposed for ~ale- in th~ open mark~t. 
)• ' ' ;. 
with a reasonable time allowed in which to find a pur-J'1;, 
chaser, buying with knowledge o!f all the u~es-anc1 pur-· 
poses to which it was adapted and for which is w~s cap_:.~­
able . . . " 29 C. J. S. 97 4. The plans offered by Jl1e de~ 
fendants and received· by the t;i~l Cou~t .~~o~. t~1;1-t t~e, 
land is capable of being· used ·as. ~- __ sribdi~is1on~ .M::r~ Croft . 
1,.' •1 ,' I 
on page 120 of the transcript testified thf1t' it wovlq ~e _ 
possible to design a subdivision J~ntirely upop ~i~: OW:P. ''; 
land. Witness Gunnell testified that· :the pro,perty is 
best suited for a subdivision, Tr~ ]0 at line ~0. Mr. Baugh 
' .. \ ., ,' . ' ·-
a witness for the- plaintiff. testified on page 199 of. the_ 
transcript that. he v:;t~ued. the. lan¢l r.as. property capable 
of b~ing sub-divided. witn:ess :B:~ugh ,.als~ testifie;d .. ltJ:wA 
; ,' ., ._f-_ 
he felt that Mr. Croft ;shou~d b~ ~onpens:ated according , 
to the basis of other simil8.r purchases in the area during 
the time; of- discussion, (Tr. 206,) and ~on ~page ·2:1~7- ofiilhe 
Tr. that he was aware of the sale of. ~and: JH~~t~ d~r ;l;Q ~ 
the south .for about $8-,000 per: acre~ and he also testified: ... 
that.in his opinion there was little diff~rence betw.eerr th~ , 
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12 
value of the inside and the outside lots. The exhibit com-
plained of by the plaintiff shows defendants compara-
ble land also sold, and comparability of the values. 
The sale Mr. Baugh referred to came about in an 
unusual manner. (See map- p. 3 plaintiff's brief). This 
was the Nichols property and the subject of the con-
de~nnation in a separate suit filed the same day as ours. 
The two. cases were consoladated for trial. On the 
. \ ' . 
morning of the trial, the attorney for Nichols announced 
that the School Board had effected a voluntary settle-
ment with ,Nichols. The attorneys for plaintiff agreed, 
and that case was dismis$ed or ·otherwise disposed of. 
The. price voluntary paid to Nichols (which Mr. Baugh 
referred ot) would no doubt, have some influence on the 
jury. These facts do not appear in the record of our 
case, but we think that opposing counsel will agree that 
these facts are a matter of record in the. District Court 
below. 
Plans showing subdivisions have been allowed into 
evidence without error; State vs. Peek et al, 1 Utah 2d 
263, 265 P. 2d 630. It appears in that case, without com-
ment by this' Court that there were lands not owned by the 
condemnee shown· on the map, where there were dipicted 
established subdivisions and proposed subdivisions. We 
can see ·no difference between the plat there and the plat 
hi the instant case as both plats showed an are·a greater 
than that ·condemned and showed proposed improve-
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ments. In the case of Daly City v. Smith; 243. P .. 2d 46, 
the California Appellate Court said that, '~the court 
made it clear that. evidence of propqse<;I il)).prQ::vem~nts," , 
may be admissable to show adaptability of the land for 
that use, but it cannot' be adillit'ted •. to ~how enhanced 
loss because the owner is prohibited .from carryi:rig out 
that particular ·imt>'rovem~nt.'' The Cobrt:lie're'was': ob"' 
viously referring to multiply!ng: the profit per let 
times the number of lots. This·'oilr defendants did not 
do. Any discussion of lots found' in the reco-rd was :first 
propounded by the plaintiff, aild, he· cBrtainly c3;nnot -
complain of his own questiorls and answers received 
therefore as error. Also there is no testimony in the- · 
record produced by the defendab.t showing the loss·: Mr: 
Croft has suffered by reason of 'his inabliity to put his 
plan in to use. 
The plat in this case, as ori 'the P~ek Case, ~:Upra; 
shows an intended use. The cithition by the plaintiff out 
of 18 Am. Jur. 991 is not the law in this state, as any pi~t 
must show an intended use, and therefore the plaintiff is· · 
in effect asserting that all plats are inadmissible as they · 
show·a use intended for the future. How·else c~na-de;,t 
fendant in a ·condemnation ·action show: :either ·by testi"', 
mony and documentary "evidence the'· best· use· the land 
can be put to. Plaintiff would have us value the land. a;s 
pasture as this is the only use·it is presently put, to, and 
this is certainly not the law, as the present potentia}r::o:E-
property makes the 'Present market 'value,: and the 'plans: 
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in this case sh-owed the adaptability of the land for .sub-
division purposes and it seems immaterial to us that the 
subdivision encompased other property not owned by the 
defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion. we desire to cite the very recent csae 
from the Supreme Court of United States (decided 
March 5, 1962), Thomas N. Briggs, Petitioneer vs. Coun-
ty of Allegheny,-------- U. S. ________ , 7 L. ed 2d 585, 82 S. Ct. 
--------· It should be remembered that the 5th Amendment 
to the U. S. Constitution ("nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation") 
does not contain the ''damage'' clause such as is the 
case in Utah. 
That case held that where the County had built 
an airport with use of 50% to 75% Federal funds, and 
the air approach to one of the runways was over petition-
er' a home, he was entitled to damages to his home 
"though no part thereof was taken" (from 78-34-10 sub. 
3 DCA, 1953). We have found no Federal Statute im-
plementing the 5th Amendment, such as the case under 
Utah laws and its constitution. 
Respectfully submitted 
Geo. D. Preston & 
Geo. W. Preston 
... t\.ttorneys for Defendants & 
Respondents 
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